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T HERE are at least two good reasons why the present is a paT
ticularly appropriate time for a thorough reconsideration of the
program of economic regulation which has governed civil air trans-
portation in this country for the last seventeen years. First, the high
level of general business activity and the accompanying prosperity of
the airlines furnish a propitious atmosphere for the abandonment of
restrictionist policies adopted in the depression years and minimize
the resulting possible hardships to vested interests. No doubt the
acceptance of protectionism in hard times rests on a profoundly mis-
taken view of the causes and proper remedies of business fluctuations.
Nevertheless, it should surely be easier to liberalize government policy
at a time when competition does not take on the aspect of a one-way
street to general bankruptcy. Indeed, the matter is one of some
urgency: if we do not take advantage of favorable times to effect liber-
alization, protectionism may gradually spread throughout the economy
by a sort of ratchet action motivated by the customary ups and downs
of business activity. An "apparent trend" toward restrictive regulation
has recently been brought to the attention of the Attorney General
by the National Committee appointed by him to study the antitrust
laws;' some of the Committee went farther, to favor "a general recom-
mendation to Congress that the trend toward regulation should be
checked or even reversed";2 and one member, who took a broader view
of the Committee's terms of reference than did the others, strongly
urged review of such measures as the Motor Carrier and Civil Aero-
nautics Acts, which were adopted in "a time of desperation when we
nearly abandoned free competition entirely in favor of industry self-
regulation under NRA."3
' Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Anti-
trust Laws (Washington, U.S.G.P.O., 1955), p. 269.
2 Ibid.
8 Ibid., pp. 288-289. In view of the striking similarity between the economic
characteristics of the motor carrier industry and those of air transportation, it is
significant for the present inquiry that several of the Committee favored "specify-
ing the motor carrier industry as an example of unnecessary restriction of com-
petition through regulation of entry and minimum rates" (p. 269).
192
RECONSIDERATION OF ENTRY CONTROL
SUBSIDY AND ECONOMIC POLICY
Second, the very considerable amount of study which has been
devoted to the air transport subsidy problem since the war has made
it clear that, at least in most of the domestic field, the national interest
does not require the kind of financial support by the government which
raises difficulties in connection with economic policy; and that even
in international operations a considerable increase in economic free-
dom is not only possible but highly desirable from the government's
own standpoint. This reexamination of the support program has
recently culminated in the report of the Air Coordinating Committee
on Civil Air Policy4 which proposes the termination of direct-payment
support to air carriers with certain limited exceptions mainly in inter-
national operations.
The Committee recommends (1) that schedules be immediately
established "for the orderly reduction, and withdrawal where appro-
priate, of domestic air carrier subsidy support"; 5 (2) that carriers
capable of "sustained" (?) self-sufficiency be made ineligible for fur-
ther direct subvention;6 and (3) in the absence of "compelling public
interest considerations to the contrary," that support be withdrawn
from any operation without "reasonable prospect for economic self-
sufficiency in the foreseeable future" notwithstanding the existence
of a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing this
operation." As to international operations, the Committee concludes
that direct-payment support may be required for a long period of time.
Even here, however, it is clearly brought out that the national interest
not only does not require but is not best served by a virtually unlimited
commitment to support a given carrier or any part of its services.9
These conclusions clear the way for important changes in economic
policy in both the foreign and the domestic fields. They represent a
definite rejection of the proposition which was apparently basic to both
the subsidy and regulatory features of the Civil Aeronautics Act: that
the national interest with respect to commercial air transport could
be identified with permanent profits for individual air carriers.10 In
only one respect does the A. C. C. report attempt to link the national
interest with the profits of particular carriers, namely, in its suggestion
that excess profits on some routes be deliberately fostered in order to
finance uneconomic services on others. This suggestion will be more
fully discussed later on.
4 Civil Air Policy, A Report by the Air Coordinating Committee by Direction
of the President (Washington, U.S.G.P.O., 1954).
5 Ibid., p. 11.
6 Ibid., p. 9.
7 Ibid., p. 7.
s Ibid., p. 9.
9 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
10 On this point, see Lucile S. Keyes, Federal Control of Entry into Air
Transportation (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1951). Consider also the
following remark in Civil Air Policy, p. 8: "The Government's main interest in
subsidizing air transportation is to assure service adequate for the public and
national interests rather than to preserve any individual carrier."
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It should not be supposed that the present regulatory program was
ever actually justified by the existence of a national promotional policy
with respect to air transport, or that the liberalization of economic
policy had to await the development of the industry to a point where
promotion would no longer be necessary. The need-rate program,
with its broad implications for the proper scope of government control
over the business decisions of the carriers and for the enforced limita-
tion of competition among firms which under this program had almost
literally nothing to lose, was never the most desirable or appropriate
means of providing support. The government, like other purchasers
of air transport service, has always stood to gain by the most efficient
possible performance of the subsidized service, which in turn could
only result from the maximum of free competition consistent with the
mechanics of subsidization. Moreover, there is little doubt that a sup-
port program not involving a virtual guarantee of individual carrier
profits could have been developed at any time in the past; that such a
program could have been a more effective way of accomplishing any
really justifiable policy of promotion; and that one of the main points
in its favor would have been the greater scope for competition which
it would have permitted. There are many types of promotional pro-
gram whose administration does not involve any restriction on the
competitive activity of the subsidized firms. Among these are tax
remission, government financing of essential research, free or below-
cost airways, and other devices whose cost does not increase with the
number or capacity of firms participating in the subsidized activity.
Some other forms of promotion, such as direct payments to carriers,
do necessitate some limitation on the number of firms subsidized at
any given time, but not only do not rule out but require for maximum
effectiveness a periodic opportunity for review of commitments to
particlar firms and possible replacement by others.
No promotional program justifies protection of the revenues of
subsidized firms from unsubsidized competition. If from an activity
comparable to that subsidized, such competition may well mean that
support is not really necessary. To the extent that such competition
adds to the expense of necessary support, it is a legitimate addition to
the cost of the program and should not be obscured or shifted to pro-
tective regulation. Furthermore, because a certain amount of "dead
loss" to existing and potential air transport users will almost certainly
result from protective regulation, the cost of support to the community
as a whole will in all probability be greater as compared with sub-
sidization without protection. In this respect, support through protec-
tion is similar to "internal subsidization," which is discussed below.
Thus neither a change in the independent viability of air transport
nor a shift in national objectives was necessary to pave the way for a
more liberal economic policy, as regards both the administration of
the subsidy and the treatment of market competition with the subsi-
dized firms. What was necessary was a long overdue look at the defects
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of basic air transport policy. If the existing program is due any praise
for its past performance, it is only because of the possible political
unavailability of superior alternatives. In this connection, let us not
forget the relative unpopularity in 1938 of any serious consideration
of national defense needs, to say nothing of attempts to get adequate
appropriations for these needs, as compared with the reception given
to measures presented, like the Civil Aeronautics Act, as means of
correcting the allegedly wasteful and unreasonable effects of competi-
tion by the benevolent hand of state intervention.
The A. C. C. report clearly recognizes the possibility of liberalizing
the administration of the support program in the international field,
despite the anticipated necessity for direct subvention for an indefinite
period. The Committee's recommendation of a thorough overhaul of
the present system of unlimited commitments to particular carriers,
its suggestion that this system might be replaced by "administration
of subsidies in the form of fixed-term contracts, in which the Board
would specify the maximum amount of the Government's subsidy
commitments,"" and its proposal that careful consideration be given
to "whether the service can be rendered by other United States carriers
with less or no subsidy' 1 2 evidently represent a genuine attempt at
broadening the role of competition in the future administration of
direct-payment subsidy. As has been noted, however, this method of
support by its very nature requires an exclusive commitment to par-
ticular carriers at least on a temporary basis. It also tends to lend
weight to (unjustified) arguments for regulatory restrictions on unsub-
sidized competition on grounds of government economy. This consid-
eration might possibly explain the Committee's failure to recommend
the liberalization of economic regulation in the international sphere.
Even these complications should soon be largely absent in domestic
air transport, where it is now recognized that direct subvention is
generally unnecessary.
PRESENT 'STATUS OF THE CASE FOR ENTRY CONTROL
Oddly enough, the A. C. C. report contains no proposal for greater
economic freedom in domestic operations. For its failure to recom-
mend liberalization of entry control under the Civil Aeronautics Act,
the Committee advances three reasons: (1) that experience has shown
that the continuation of the present policy is necessary "to assure the
maintenance of sound economic conditions, capable of supporting on
a stable basis an adequate level of essential public service"; (2) that
carrier profits on "strong routes" must be protected in order "to offset
losses on weak routes"; and (3) that protection of carrier profits is
needed to enable the government to "discharge its public obligation
to minimize subsidy expenditures.' 3 As we have seen, the third point
11 Civil Air Policy, p. 10.
12 Ibid., p. 7.
13 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
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is both generally unacceptable and presumably irrelevant for that
large part of the domestic field where direct subvention is to be
dropped: in the report, government economy reenters the domestic
picture only as the motivation of a scheme for enabling the govern-
ment to avoid the cost of supporting any remaining uneconomic seg-
ments. The issues raised by this scheme are essentially the same as
those involved in point (2), which will be one of the main centers of
attention in this section. Also discussed will be other arguments
bearing on the problem of entry control, among these being the
Committee's point (1) regarding "sound economic conditions." In
conclusion, certain short-run policy problems will be briefly treated
in the light of the preceding discussion.
As a result of a study undertaken some years ago, 14 the present
writer concluded that no available evidence or argument showed a
need for the existing type of Federal control over entry into air trans-
port markets, though it was conceivable that future experience might
show that some limitation on competitive freedom would be necessary
to safeguard a desirable degree of regularity in air transport service.
Since that time, experience has served to confirm the conclusion and
remove the qualification, which was never anything more than the
recognition of a possibility that could not then be definitely denied.
As might indeed have been expected, competitive pressures in the air
transport field are a powerful force working toward rather than away
from greater regularity of service, which is a pattern naturally imposed
by market demand. 15 Even had experience proved the contrary, this
could hardly have justified the present type of certification, which is
geared to the protection of the revenues of individual air carriers. A
compulsory commitment to adhere to published schedules except after
a certain period of notice-perhaps enforced by a device such as certifi-
cate revocation-would seem to be a much more satisfactory solution.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the argument for protective
certification based on regularity of service is no longer fashionable.
The same can be said for the once-popular arguments that protective
entry control was necessary to preserve desirable standards in the treat-
ment of employees and in safety of operation. In both cases, this
relative unpopularity is no doubt partly due to the very large and
conspicuous effort which has gone into the development of more direct
methods of preserving these standards. It may also be due, however,
to a growing realization of the implications of these arguments, which
in fact must either fail or prove too much. If the protection of indi-
vidual carrier profits from competitive inroads is necessary to preserve
labor and safety standards, this can only mean that any threat of loss,
without regard to origin, cannot be tolerated in the air transport field.
There is surely no reason to suppose that hard times due to competi-
14 Cited in note 10 above.
15 See, for example, the discussion of exempted air transport operations in
Civil Air Policy, p. 20.
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tion should have any more drastic consequences for airline employees
and passengers than hard times due to any other type of decline in
demand for any carrier's services or to overexpansion resulting from
bad judgment. Thus if this type of argument is valid, it proves the
necessity of a government guarantee of carrier profits, and, as a logical
consequence, the inappropriateness of the industry for private owner-
ship since there can be no private risk.
Recent Views On Regulatory Control
There is, however, a familiar echo of 1937-38 in assertions like the
following, which is in fact of surprisingly recent vintage:
"The principle of controlled entry is widely applied in other forms
of transportation, as well as in other types of public utilities. In
all of these fields, as in air transportation, it has been found that
the public interest requires a pattern of regulatory control, to
assure the maintenance of sound economic conditions, capable of
supporting on a stable basis an adequate level of essential public
service."16
If we define "sound economic conditions" in a given line of business
to mean the permanent profitability of every firm in that line, then
there is little doubt that one way of promoting these conditions
(though not of assuring them) is the use of governmental power to
quash any serious competition, both from new firms and among the
fortunate incumbents. One has only to state this definition, however,
to realize that it is quite unacceptable. It has of course never been
found that protective regulation is essential to assure continued pro-
vision of an adequate supply of air transport services, any more than
it is necessary to secure an adequate supply of soap, doorknobs, or
automobiles.
Assertions like that quoted above, which in the old days were cus-
tomarily backed up by references to railroad rate wars and competitive
bidding for air mail contracts under an administrative system which
could not possibly have produced satisfactory results, is now related
to a claim that protection of carriers' excess revenues in profitable
markets is justified in order to enable them to serve non-paying classes
of traffic. Indeed, this claim now forms whatever economic content
remains in the still-used formula that air transport is a "public utility":
a remarkable, if understandable, metamorphosis since the days when
"public utility" treatment generally found its economic justification
in the desirability of avoiding waste of large amounts of fixed resources
and in the peculiarities of certain products which made unified man-
agement essential to maximum satisfaction of demand. The meta-
morphosis is understandable for several reasons, one being the fact
that the old forms of the argument were such obvious misfits for air
transportation, and another being the point that the argument did
not in either form justify a policy aimed toward protection or against
competition as such. For example, it furnished no rationale for any
16 Civil Air Policy, p. 18.
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control over the entry into the market served by the regulated firm or
firms of companies producing technologically dissimilar substitutes.
The mere application of the term "public utility" to air transpor-
tation adds nothing in the way of economic substance to the argument
for protectionism. Nevertheless, the phrase is currently used in its
capacity as legal category in an attempt to show that precedent supports
regulatory protection for purposes of internal subsidization-i. e. the
financing of uneconomic operations as parasites on services capable of
self-sufficiency. For example:
"Every form of transportation involves services which have vary-
ing degrees of economic strength. Normally, however, in forms of
transportation where subsidy is not available, the carriers them-
selves support their unprofitable services through earnings derived
on their profitable routes. This is consistent with the normal public
utility concept in which the furnishing of needed, but unprofitable,
service is part of the obligation assumed by a carrier in exchange
for the franchise it receives on its more profitable routes.' 17
And again:
"In keeping with the normal public utility concept, certificated car-
riers have a statutory obligation to maintain all authorized services
needed by the public on both strong and weak routes .... If car-
riers are to provide the full scale of services needed by the public
with minimum reliance on Federal subsidy, they must be able to
earn sufficient profits on strong routes to offset losses on weak
routes."' 8
This sort of contention would perhaps carry more weight-at least
in some circles-if it were in fact the carriers (that is, their stockhold-
ers) who would pay for the support of uneconomic services. But it is
quite obviously not the stockholders but the users of the profitable
services who would foot the bill: the argument for protectionism must
rest on the assumption that, if there were no state intervention, these
users would be furnished the same service at a lower price. There is
no justification for saddling a random section of the travelling public
with the cost of this support.
Burdening One Class of Traffic
Furthermore, the suggested practice, far from being "consistent
with the normal public utility concept" is entirely in opposition to
the overwhelming weight of precedent in this field. In all the various
forms in which the problem presents itself to a regulatory commission,
the actual burdening of one class of traffic in order to provide below-
cost service to another is in the great majority of cases rejected as
contrary to public policy. For example, as Dr. I. L. Sharfman has
noted, it has been the general practice of the Interstate Commerce
Commission from the very beginning to refuse to permit the fixing of
rates "so low as to impose a burden on other traffic,"19 and in this view
17 Ibid., p. 8.
18 Ibid., p. 18.
19 Rate8 and Charges on Food Products, 3 I.C.R. 93, 104 (1890) cited in I. L.
Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission (New York, The Commonwealth
Fund, 1936), Part III, Volume B, p. 444.
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the Commission has had consistent judicial support.20 The special
obligation of the public utility or common carrier to serve all on equal
terms is not an obligation to serve at a loss. What is denied to these
firms is not the right to cover specific costs but rather the right, nor-
mally possessed by other businesses, to refuse to deal with any prospec-
tive customer for any reason or for no reason, as a matter of personal
discretion. Apparent exceptions to this highly sensible rule are mainly
to be found in the relatively minor field of State regulation of public
utility abandonments of parts of their operations. Even here, a losing
service will not generally be ordered continued unless the burden to
the system is very small and the service of considerable significance to
the affected community.2' In view of the strength of local protests in
many such cases, the surprising thing is perhaps the extent to which
the regulators have resisted pressures making for internal subsidiza-
tion. Moreover, it is quite certain that this exception is merely a means
of preventing hardship (where this can be done at not too great a cost)
to vested interests rather than a policy deliberately planned as a
"normal" quid pro quo for a franchise. This is clearly shown by the
customary recognized limit on the power of Commissions to order
extensions of service: in general, the use of this power is limited to
situations where it appears that the ordered extension will promptly
earn its way and not burden the rest of the system.22 In the regulation
of railroad abandonments under the Interstate Commerce Act, though
the leading judicial pronouncements leave open some degree of regu-
20 To illustrate: Norfolk and Western Ry. Co. v. West Virginia, 236 U.S. 605,
609 (1915) : "... . it would not be contended that the State might require passen-
gers to be carried for nothing, or that it could justify such action by placing upon
the shippers of goods the burden of excessive charges in order to supply an ade-
quate return for the carrier's entire service. And, on the same principle, it would
also appear to be outside the field of reasonable adjustment that the State should
demand the carriage of passengers at a rate so low that it would not defray the
cost of their transportation, when the entire traffic under the rate was considered,
or would provide only a nominal reward in addition to cost."
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. State of North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585, 598 (1915):
"In substance, the argument is that the rate was imposed to aid in the develop-
ment of a local industry and thus to confer a benefit upon the people of the State.
The importance to the community of its deposits of lignite coal, the infancy of the
industry, and the advantages to be gained by increasing the consumption of this
coal and making the community less dependent upon fuel supplies imported into
the State, are emphasized. But while local interests serve as a motive for enforc-
ing reasonable rates, it would be a very different matter to say that the State may
compel the carrier to maintain a rate upon a particular commodity that is less
than reasonable, or-as might equally well be asserted-to carry gratuitously, in
order to build up a local enterprise. That would be to go outside the carrier's
undertaking, and outside the field of reasonable supervision of the conduct of its
business, and would be equivalent to an appropriation of the property to public
uses upon terms to which the carrier had in no way agreed. It does not aid the
argument to urge that the State may permit the carrier to make good its loss by
charges for other transportation. If other rates are exorbitant, they may be
reduced. Certainly, it could not be said that the carrier may be required to charge
excessive rates to some in order that others might be served at a rate unreason-
ably low. That would be but arbitrary action. We cannot reach the conclusion
that the rate in question is to be supported upon the ground of public policy if,
upon the facts found, it should be deemed to be less than reasonable." (Emphasis
supplied.)
21 See, for example, C. Woody Thompson and Wendell R. Smith, Public Utility
Economics (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1941), pp. 448-449.
22 Ibid., pp. 443-444.
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latory discretion for the recognition of local user interests in the
continuation of a losing service which can be supported by the system
as a whole, the record of Commission action strongly suggests that the
continuance of unprofitable services is in fact not ordered unless there
is good evidence that they will cease to be unprofitable in a relatively
short time; in many cases, Commission decisions denying permission
to abandon have been reversed when the earnings situation failed to
improve. 23
Internal subsidization would be equally contrary to past policy
under the Civil Aeronautics Act, where neither Congress nor Board
has ever manifested any intention of putting such a program into
effect. As a matter of fact, the Board was never given the power to
order extensions of service to new routes, whether profitable or
unprofitable. It is simply unthinkable that a program of regulation
whose raison d'etre was internal subsidization should have been drawn
up without the inclusion of this power (which, incidentally, had been
given to the Interstate Commerce Commission with respect to railroads
as early as 1920) . If there are at present points or routes on air carrier
systems that really do result in a burden on other traffic, they have
resulted from mistakes rather than deliberate policy. These mistakes,
if any, can not now be reinterpreted as enlightened decisions and cited
in support of restrictive regulation.
Possibly some misinterpretation of precedent has arisen from the
fact that many regulated businesses-in common with a great many
that are not regulated-normally serve various classes of customer at
prices which contribute respectively more or less than a pro-rata share
to the coverage of general overhead. So far from being a burden on
the more profitable classes, however, this practice, since it permits the
coverage of some of the overhead by purchases which would not be
made at a price equal to fully-allocated cost, is in general a means of
relief for the former group, given normal profits for the firm as a whole.
If a policy of internal subsidization should be adopted, it might
well result in some saving of government funds where some special
necessity or political convenience dictated the continuance of a losing
service. As has been indicated, the cost of supporting such a service
would be neither magically erased nor shifted to the beneficiary of a
public franchise. But this is not all. Because the higher price charged
for the profitable service will in all probability result not only in excess
earnings in this line but also in the loss of some traffic which would
have travelled at a lower rate, the cost of support to the community as
a whole will almost surely be increased as compared with that sustained
under a program of direct subsidization. This is because the decline
in traffic involves some loss to the shipping or travelling public without
any accompanying contribution to the earnings of the carrier.
23 This question is discussed at somewhat greater length in Lucile S. Keyes,
"Passenger Fare Policies of the Civil Aeronautics Board," 18 Journal of Air Law
and Commerce 46 (1951).
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Finally, and perhaps of the greatest importance, there is the ques-
tion of general precedent. If the argument for protective regulation
to finance internal subsidization is accorded respectability in connec-
tion with air transportation, it may be applied with great plausibility
to a large number of industries with similar economic characteristics.
The prospect is even less reassuring if there is general acceptance of
the view that a price policy resulting in unequal per-unit contribu-
tions to overhead is evidence of the "normal" existence of internal
subsidization.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In sum, the arguments now fashionable in support of regulatory
protection appear to be if anything less impressive than those current
seventeen years ago; moreover, it appears that no more acceptable
arguments are about to present themselves. As evidence for this, we
may cite the crucial importance now generally attributed to the inter-
nal subsidization argument by the proponents of protectionism. Con-
sider, for example, the following statement in a recent study prepared
by the staff of the Senate Commerce Committee (emphasis supplied)
"Service which is not self-supporting can be continued only if it is
supported, either by subsidy, or by the profits from routes which
are self-supporting. That is the choice which must be made-unless
service on non-self-supporting routes is to be abandoned.
"To abandon service on all routes which are not self-supporting
would mean abandonment of the objectives of the Civil Aeronautics
Act. If that were to be done, the whole system of regulation set up
by the act should also be abandoned and the carriers, certificated
and uncertificated, should be released from their present restraints
and permitted to compete freely. Free enterprise should be per-
mitted to determine the amount of competition and the service to
be rendered. 24
On the other hand, there is no reason to suppose that the old and
well-known case for free competition has lost any of its force in the
interim,25 or that the assignment of a protective aim to the regulators
has become any more conducive to the proper functioning of either
regulation or management.26 Indeed, had there been any need for a
specific demonstration of the benefits of free competition in air trans-
portation, it would have been providentially fulfilled by the postwar
experience with noncertificated carriers. Therefore, the Congress
should promptly provide for the abolition of entry control geared to
the protection of carrier revenues.
It may well be that this aim can be most satisfactorily accomplished
through a Congressional policy declaration affecting the working
24Aviation Study Prepared for the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, Senate Document No. 163, 83d Congress, 2d Session, 1955, p. 48.
25 See, for example, Keyes, Federal Control of Entry into Air Transportation,
and "National Policy Towards Commercial Aviation-Some Basic Problems," 16
Journal of Air Law and Commerce 280 (1949).
28 This practice forfeits some of the main advantages of regulated private
ownership as compared with government ownership. On this point, see Lucile S.
Keyes, "Some Controversial Aspects of the Public Corporation," Political Science
Quarterly, March, 1955.
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criteria of the regulatory agency rather than through outright rescis-
sion of the certification requirement itself. As has been noted, this
requirement may possibly prove in the long run to be the best avail-
able means of carrying out certain objectives other than protection.
The power to withdraw authority to operate would appear to be a most
effective weapon of enforcement for any type of regulation. In addition,
as a strictly temporary expedient to decrease opposition on grounds of
government economy, it may be desirable to synchronize the removal
of protection with the termination of need-rate subsidy in the various
sectors of domestic air transport. Such a program might well be accom-
plished by a continuation of the Board's powers of certification together
with a progressive liberalization of their administration. Great care
should be taken, however, to make Congressional intent in such a
policy declaration entirely clear, in order to minimize the chance that
faulty administration might prevent the actual elimination of all the
anticompetitive elements of entry control. Moreover, no time should
be lost in putting the new policy into effect: first, to insure the con-
tinuation of noncertificated services now operating on subsidy-free
routes, and, second, to avoid the possibility that the now self-supporting
certificated carriers might slip back to a subsidized status before the
Board should put an end to their eligibility for subvention.
The continuation of protection cannot be defended as a permanent
or long-run method of reducing government expenses in connection
with any type of subsidy. With respect to international air transport, as
the A. C. C. report suggests, attention should immediately be directed
to the formulation of a support program free from the objectionable
features of that now in operation. The institution of this program on
any given route might mark the most acceptable occasion for the
removal of protection with respect to services on that route.
